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The 1812 campaign had started well for Wellington and his Anglo-Portuguese
army. Forcing the border fortresses, the allies entered Spain and, after beating
the main French field army at Salamanca, took Madrid on August 12.
Wellington’s next move was to march northward against the grouping of enemy
forces under General Clausel. There, about halfway towards the French frontier,
stood the city of Burgos, the historical capital of Castile. The month-long siege that
followed, in which a garrison of 2000 French troops successfully defied
Wellington’s army of over 30,000 is reasonably well known, although it has not
been given much prominence. Dominating Britain’s political and military life for
almost forty years after the war, the duke was known to disdain open criticism of
his actions. This compelled a whole generation of memoirists and early historians
to convey their observations in a very careful manner. Subsequent scholarship of
the Peninsular War often took at face value their accounts, which emphasize the
lack of resources, failings of individual regiments, errors by engineers and artillery
officers and lack of cooperation by the Spanish allies. In other words, Anglophone
historians were essentially reproducing the explanations provided by Wellington
for his failure to take Burgos. Prompted by the rediscovery of the original siege
works and closely supported by thorough rereading, often between the lines, of all
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known contemporary sources, Esdaile and Freeman are aiming to set the record
straight.
As suggested by its title, this volume does more than provide an account of the
siege. It traces Burgos’ transformation from a prosperous medieval city to an
impoverished provincial town well before the French occupation. Burgos’ experi-
ence during the Peninsular War was exacerbated by its position on a major road
from the Pyrenees to Madrid. It was one of the first cities taken by the French.
A failed attempt to resist Napoleon’s advance in November 1808 led to another
capture and a sack. The emperor ordered Burgos’ medieval castle to be strength-
ened and it was the local population which was compelled to provide the funds and
the workforce. Burgos was not unique when it was forced to maintain a French
garrison and string of embezzling governors, but its inhabitants also had to supply
large bodies of French troops which regularly passed through the city on their way
to the south. More generally, Burgos’ destitute condition and its Gothic cathedral
came to play ‘a substantial role in what may be termed the cultural history of the
Peninsular War. Thus, the first substantial place that most French troops involved
in the struggle came to, it confirmed their darkest suspicions: in brief, Spain was
not just poor and backward, but literally mediaeval’ (29).
Coming to the events of 1812, the authors suggest that when Wellington left
Madrid he was still unresolved whether or not to attack Burgos, initially preferring
to unite with the Spanish Sixth Army. This delay allowed Clausel to avoid battle,
while Wellington found himself in front of a strong fortress with inadequate
resources. Actually, it is stunning how badly the allies were prepared for the
siege operations. Wellington’s army had only five heavy guns and three mortars
and fewer than 3,000 rounds of ammunition. Unable to bombard the fortress into
submission and fearing the repetition of what happened at Badajoz, where the
successful storm cost thousands of casualties, Wellington drew up plans calling
for a number of mid-sized assault parties to strike in unison under the covering
fire of their comrades in the trenches. These plans called for far greater coordin-
ation and precision than could be reasonably expected, and storming parties
often arrived at the walls unsupported and too weak to succeed against the alert
defenders. Faced with a growing threat to his communications by French forces
converging against Madrid, Wellington was compelled to lift the siege on October
21. By the end of the November the allies were back in Portugal, having endured a
further 5,000 casualties during a grim winter retreat, adding to the 2,000 men
already lost in Burgos.
Esdaile’s and Freeman’s analysis of the siege and campaign is engagingly writ-
ten, rich in detail and offers many new insights. The survival in situ of the physical
remnants of the fighting, including siege trenches, breaches blown in the outer
fortifications and retrenchments put up by the French defenders, greatly improve
our understanding of what actually happened and why. What prevents the book
from becoming a superb introduction to conflict archaeology is the complete lack
of photographs and the low resolution of the map reproductions, which are
reduced to a fraction of their original size. This is even less acceptable when one
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considers the hefty price of this slim volume. Despite the inconvenience, one is also
advised to read very carefully through the small font of the appendices and the
lengthy footnotes. Astonishingly, it turns out that Wellington had access to a
detailed French plan of Burgos’ fortifications, captured in Madrid, if not earlier
(155). This strongly reflects on the wisdom of marching against it without an
adequate siege train. But even when the army arrived at the fortress and the
strength of its defences became apparent, it would still have been possible to
arrange for heavy guns to be brought from the recently captured French artillery
park in Madrid or from Santander, which had just been taken by the Royal Navy.
Summons were eventually sent to the latter – nearly two weeks after Burgos was
invested and too late for the cannons to reach the fortress before the siege was
abandoned (177 n11 and 183 n4). Integrating these important points into the main
body of the text would have even more effectively conveyed the main argument of
the authors concerning who was responsible for the allied failure at Burgos: ‘the
chief blame lies with Wellington, and this, not so much because he undertook a
siege with inadequate means, as because he failed to take prompt action to remedy
the situation’ (124).
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